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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**HOMELAND SECURITY: DEVELOPING NATIONAL
DOCTRINE TO GUIDE STATE STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT**

by

Deanne B. Criswell

March 2012

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Stan Supinski
Glen Woodbury

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**HOMELAND SECURITY: DEVELOPING NATIONAL DOCTRINE TO GUIDE
STATE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the
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ABSTRACT

If one subscribes to the belief that doctrine is a common understanding of what fundamental principles guide an organization, then this thesis demonstrates that there is currently no common understanding of homeland security. There is currently a lack of institutional doctrine that can be applied nationally for state level government to develop their homeland security strategies. The military has a long history of successfully using doctrine to develop war-fighting strategy. Comparisons can be made to the Air Force's use of doctrine to gain autonomy as well as the effect joint doctrine has on achieving unity of effort across disciplines. Additional lessons can be learned from past civil defense attempts at institutionalization and the evolution to emergency management and homeland security. By modeling of these existing, known, and accepted doctrines or lack thereof, a national homeland security doctrine could emerge.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFBD-1	Air Force Basic Doctrine 1
AFM	Air Force Field Manual
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CPG 101	Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101
CSA	Combat Support Agency
CSG	Council of State Governments
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
EMAP	Emergency Management Accreditation Program
EMI	Emergency Management Institute
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FCDA	Federal Civil Defense Act
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM	Field Manual
GHQ	Government Headquarters
HSI	Homeland Security Institute
IAEM	International Association of Emergency Managers
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JP	Joint Publication
JTF	Joint Task Force
NDRF	National Disaster Recovery Framework
NEMA	National Emergency Management Association

NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NGA	National Governor's Association
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHSC	National Homeland Security Council
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NRF	National Response Framework
ODP	Office of Domestic Preparedness
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
SLG	State and Local Guide
UK	United Kingdom
USAF	United States Air Force

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I. INTRODUCTION

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment [emphasis added].

General Curtis E. LeMay
(Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS],
2007)

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND

Recent history has identified weaknesses in our nation's ability to coordinate and collaborate across disciplines and jurisdictions, resulting in the revision of how we organize planning efforts across the nation. From this new organization, the concept of homeland security formed, requiring different leadership skills and tools in order to manage the ever-changing threat of terrorist activity toward the United States.

In response, state government began to incorporate homeland security into their organizations. Homeland security at the federal level provides several strategies but lacks institutional doctrine that can be applied nationally for state level government. Subsequently, state homeland security strategies and structures vary across the nation. For example, the revisions of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Homeland Security Council, 2007) and the *National Response Framework* (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2008b) demonstrate that this growing field is continuing to develop. However, interpretations are oftentimes different within each state, consequently creating inconsistency throughout the nation in executing the intent of these policies. This inconsistency is troubling, as the responsibility for developing and executing homeland security strategies and missions will almost always fall to the state and local authorities. Furthermore, these misaligned strategies create tension in the collaboration efforts amongst state departments, clear lines of authority are often askew, and there is a failure to institutionalize homeland security within the state. A common

doctrine could link these efforts, advocating a common purpose or direction for the state, but such doctrine does not presently exist. The intent of such a doctrine is to provide a single national doctrinal from which states can develop individual strategy, not necessarily to develop independent doctrines for each state. There is a need for a national consensus regarding the relevance of homeland security.

Doctrine, as defined for this thesis, is a set of guiding principles that establish the foundation for the various strategies and policies of an organization. Doctrine defines a system that accounts for competing agendas and priorities within their current missions, applying the lessons learned from history to achieve the fundamental principles for the state. The military application of doctrine is an example that clearly demonstrates this concept.

Decades of military doctrine have provided fundamental principles to build the strategies and policies necessary in accomplishing military missions. The success the military has had with this model demonstrates the validity and need for sound doctrinal documents and makes the military the leading example to follow in the development of future doctrine. Current military doctrine applied in a global environment is set in motion through strategy development. States can take a proactive role and learn from the military model to define their homeland security doctrine. This is not to say that individual states are not successful in achieving their homeland security goals, but there is room for improvement and standardization. Homeland security at all levels is evolving; therefore, change is expected. It is time to coalesce around the strengths of each of these programs, learn from the military model, and build sound, national doctrine that all can benefit from.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION(S)

1. What should be included in a homeland security doctrine?
2. How can the principles of military doctrine be applied to state homeland security programs from a national perspective?
3. What already exists within homeland security at the state level nationally?

4. What are the fundamental pillars for good doctrine based on the military model?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature supporting the concept of doctrine is extensive and broad. Definitions of doctrine expand across a broad range of disciplines. A review of the literature surrounding doctrine in other disciplines offers some universal themes that could be applied to the homeland security lexicon. Religious and military doctrines have the most mature development, implementation, and support. For example, religious doctrine, such as Catholicism, sets the foundation for more than one billion members. Presidential doctrine typically identifies the current president's foreign policy goals. The first major presidential doctrine is considered that of James Monroe in 1823 (Martin, n.d.). There is also political doctrine, such as egalitarianism a "political doctrine that holds that all people should be treated as equals and have the same political, economic, social, and civil rights" (Egalitarian, n.d.). Other examples of doctrine include legal doctrine or constitutional doctrine and the fairness doctrine (media), which advocated that the media demonstrate a fair and unbiased view of the news. The significance of these examples is the strength of each entity gains surrounding their doctrinal beliefs.

1. Defining Doctrine

Military doctrine provides the most accepted model. *Department of Defense Joint Publication 1* (JP-1) (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2007), defines doctrine as the fundamental principles and overarching guidance for joint wartime operations. *The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02B* (CJCSI 5120.02B) (JCS, 2009) states that doctrine is perspective; "Joint doctrine represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best)." *Air Force Basic Doctrine 1*(AFBD-1) (United States Air Force [USAF], 2003) follows this thinking, stating that doctrine is a set of foundational statements that represent basic principles and beliefs in support of national objectives. Doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge that shapes how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces but used with good judgment. AFBD-1 further states, "military doctrine is authoritative, but unlike

policy, is not directive.” One final definition of doctrine is described in the Eionet (n.d.) thesaurus as “a policy, position or principle advocated, taught or put into effect concerning the acquisition and exercise of the power to govern or administrate in society.”

These definitions do not come without some counter arguments. The Air Force states within its own principle doctrinal document that doctrine has a mixed reputation (USAF, 2008): ‘It frequently conjures mental images of dry, arcane, lofty discussion by distant academicians and theorists, of unproven theories and unfulfilled promises, of little apparent use to the average airman trying to do a job down at the unit level.’ (USAF, 2008). During a recent military briefing, one presenter described doctrine as a point of departure. The following presenter disagreed, stating that we depart from doctrine too often and doctrine is our foundation that we should build upon (Coste & Groeninger,, 2011). In a Rand Corporation report, Long (2008) has an opposing view. He argued “that a military organization’s structure, philosophy, and preferences (grouped under the general rubric of ‘organizational culture’) have a much greater influence on the conduct of operations than written doctrine” (Long, 2008). It further argues that the culture of military organizations does more to shape doctrine than doctrine does to shape operations. It could be argued, however, that an organizations culture is indeed their doctrinal beliefs. Regardless of the point of view one takes, doctrine provides a base or starting point, and without doctrine, plans are haphazard and inconsistent.

Mintzberg (1994) supports this and implies that the failure of planning is the lack of a framework. His differentiation between strategy and planning where strategy sets the foundation and planning adds capacity. This could be applied to an interpretation of doctrine. Doctrine sets the foundation and strategy adds the capacity.

Before there can be a discussion, therefore, on how to develop homeland security doctrine for state governments, we must first discuss the relationship between policy, strategy, and doctrine. The three terms are often used interchangeably but are fundamentally different. Policy, strategy, and doctrine are integral to each other, but maintain different roles.

2. Doctrine and Strategy

The difference between doctrine and strategy is often confused in the literature. Doctrine should provide foundational information on what to do, but not specify how. According to the USAF, “We must strive above all else to be doctrinally sound, not doctrinally bound” (USAF, 2008). Doctrine, therefore, provides guidance for action and the development of strategy. Strategy defines how to implement the objectives of doctrine. Joint and other military doctrine is the basis for development of national strategy. The USAF further states, “Strategy originates in policy and addresses broad objectives and the plans for achieving them” (USAF, 2008). Doctrine is a method to link the ends with the means and strategy defines how this is accomplished to support national strategic objectives. Doctrine provides senior leaders the foundation of military core competencies, capabilities, and limitations that are included and detailed in the national security strategy (JCS, 2009). It further states that the relationship between doctrine and strategy provides an opportunity for other stakeholders to gain a better understanding of the mission.

Mintzberg (1994) provides a four-step process for strategic planning that begins with defining the culture of the organization; this is a component of doctrine. The second step is organized around the culture in terms of managers, tasks and their key relationships; this is developing strategy to implement the doctrine. To relate his definition of strategy as doctrine further, he states that strategy should be fairly solid and be able to survive difficulty (Mintzberg). He goes on to state, however, that strategy must also be able to adapt and is in fact more flexible than doctrine (Mitzenberg). This author disagrees; doctrine is the foundation and therefore should not change so easily.

That is not to say doctrine cannot change. If substantial environmental changes are occurring, then doctrine can adapt (Mintzberg, 1994). Bryson (2004) disagrees with this and focuses heavily on the fact that public and non-profit organizations need to create a public value and in order to accomplish this; leaders and managers must be effective strategists. He does follow Mintzberg in his differentiation between strategic thinking and strategic planning, but he does not dismiss strategic planning as easily (Bryson). His

theme is repeated throughout his multiple step-by-step processes in that regardless if it is called strategic planning or strategic thinking, it is all about providing an architecture to enhance decision making that contributes to the public value (Bryson).

Bryson (2004) makes some interesting comparisons as well between strategic planning and strategy that could also be inferred as doctrine and strategy. In particular, his focus on vision and purpose and the three questions he repeats throughout his book, what the organization is, what it does, and why it does it are the components that should be included in doctrine to help guide the development of strategy (Bryson). This has great bearing on homeland security because those three questions have not been answered and contribute to the ongoing conflicting interpretations of how to structure homeland security organizations.

A final point is Mintzberg's (1994) view of strategy is really doctrine. He defines strategy as the broad outlines with the specific details left to be worked out in planning. The vision is sound and can withstand the unforeseen; this is doctrine. Strategy creates the plan and adapts more easily to those surprises we are sure to face. His best example of doctrine and is a great analogy for the current lack of homeland security doctrine is in this statement, "if you have no vision but only formal plans, then every unpredicted change in the environment makes you feel like your sky is falling" (Mintzberg, 1994). This is where the current state of homeland security sits.

3. Doctrine and Policy

The intent of policy is to provide direction as compared to doctrine that provides authoritative guidance. The Air Force defines policy as "guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be accomplished. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership, political considerations, or for fiscal reasons" (USAF, 2008). Joint doctrine defines policy as providing national strategic direction, "a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives" (JCS, 2007).

Doctrine should be long lasting and stable where policy can be adapted to reflect new views or priorities and is typically reflected in strategy or executive orders. Policy, however, often determines doctrinal direction and development. This suggests the development of policy and doctrine should happen harmoniously to avoid conflict. According to CJCSI 5120.02B (JCS, 2009), “it is not always clear when a void is identified whether filling it will require new (or revised) doctrine or policy (or perhaps both). As a general rule, if the need can only be adequately addressed by using such prescriptive words as ‘shall’ and ‘must’ then the void is in policy and policy development should precede doctrine development.”

Doctrine is not policy or strategy; rather it makes policy and strategy effective. It is intended to assist the disparate branches of the military operate successfully together, recognizing the different missions that each have and must uphold (JCS, 2007).

4. Doctrine and Homeland Security

In the developing field of homeland security, doctrine should provide a starting point for decision makers to shape its structure. Rather than starting from a blank piece of paper, doctrine should outline basic principles, such as a common understanding of the mission, areas of responsibility and guidance into the future. The literature supporting doctrine for homeland security, however, is surprisingly lacking and complex at best. It is often comingled with strategy and fails to distinguish the difference clearly. This can be attributed to the perceived need to add the lexicon of homeland security into the planning process quickly to demonstrate progress towards a safer nation.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attempts to provide tools to assist all levels of government in their efforts. The *National Response Framework* (NRF) (DHS, 2008b) provides guidance on how the nation will respond to a catastrophic event. The *National Incident Management System* (NIMS) (DHS, 2008a) complements this and provides a management structure that provides the capacity for all levels of government, along with non-governmental and private sector partners to work together towards a successful outcome. The *National Preparedness Goal*, released in 2007, uses the word

doctrine to describe its intent as a preparedness doctrine (FEMA). Additionally, the *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide* (CPG) 101 (FEMA, 2010a) is suggested to be the best available planning doctrine and “provides guidelines for developing an [emergency operations plan] EOP and promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of planning and decision making.” This supports the definitions discussed earlier that doctrine is based on fundamental beliefs and principals.

To support this need for a national homeland security doctrine, recent studies have highlighted deficiencies in our current system and the importance that the state and local communities have in the overall homeland security effort. It can be argued that these deficiencies, while not listed as doctrinal gaps, are a result of no common understanding or foundational platform from which to build.

The *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland* (DHS, 2010), emphasizes “homeland security professionals must have a clear sense of what it takes to achieve the overarching vision.” And that “no single entity is responsible for or directly manages all aspects of the enterprise” (DHS, 2010). The QHSR emphasizes the need for an enterprise. The enterprise focuses on bringing together the disparate parts of our government to achieve the homeland security vision effectively. However, for an effective homeland security enterprise to work, the players have to work from a common understanding. If each state has a different set of understandings, how can we effectively achieve critical homeland security capabilities? This lack of understanding is highlighted in the report as well when it describes that homeland security “is built upon critical law enforcement functions, but is not about preventing all crimes...it is embedded in trade activities, but is neither trade nor economic policy. It requires international engagement, but is not responsible for foreign affairs” (DHS, 2010). This can be interpreted that homeland security is about ideals and the mission of these ideals is carried out by other agencies.

The QHSR suggests assembling a more cohesive stakeholder community and must include those that execute the homeland security mission on a daily basis (DHS, 2010). Coordination at this level has improved; however, findings in the QHSR (DHS,

2010) also suggest that the foundation of this community, emergency responders at the state and local level “do not necessarily think of themselves as homeland security stakeholders.”

In 2009, a survey of homeland security advisors by the National Governors Association (NGA) identified several priorities. The recurring theme in this survey, coordinating state and local efforts, seems to be indicative of the direction for the future (NGA, 2009). This theme is supported through recent revisions of some state homeland security strategies, aligning them into a broader governance structure. This is significant because the homeland security enterprise is far reaching. Responsibility to provide for the safety and security of our citizens is not bound to a particular level of government or discipline.

The QHSR reflected the push towards increased collaboration as well. The QHSR (DHS, 2010) identified the need to increase stakeholder engagement as well as be responsive to stakeholder feedback in an effort to improve our collaboration efforts. This is represented in the process of conducting the QHSR itself, allowing for the first time input for a quadrennial review from a broader stakeholder community. A key concept identified is a life cycle model of stakeholder engagement. This “reflects not only DHS leadership’s vision, but also a policy and cultural shift in government decision making” (DHS, 2010). The Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano (2009) supports this direction, stating in response to the QHSR:

We are a nation of more than 300 million. More than that, we’re a nation of families, communities, organizations, of cities, suburbs, tribes, all of their local governments and organizations. And, within these groupings lies an extraordinary pool of talent, ingenuity and strength. We face a networked enemy. We must meet it with a networked response. The job of securing our nation against the threat of terrorism is a large one, and it may never be totally completed, but we have a much larger chance at success if we strengthen our own networks by enlisting the talents and energies of Americans.

In 2006 and again in 2010, DHS conducted a nationwide plan review. The initial 39 findings in the 2006 *Nationwide Plan Review, Phase 1 and 2 Report* (DHS and

Department of Transportation) were reduced to six major observations in the 2010 *Nationwide Plan Review, Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress* (FEMA, 2010b). These observations are:

1. Catastrophic planning efforts were found to be unsystematic and uneven.
2. Rapid homeland security mission expansion and the diversity of risks outpaced planning and planning actions had outstripped planning documentation.
3. Planning processes were outmoded, current tools and guidance were rudimentary and planning expertise showed insufficiency for catastrophic incidents.
4. Collaboration requirements were not well-defined, fostering a tendency to plan internally.
5. The prevailing approach to planning emphasized general roles and responsibilities over detailed procedures for specific hazards, scenarios or thresholds of incidents.
6. The feasibility of plans was dependent on resource inventories, databases and resource tracking mechanisms, all of which were areas of universal weakness (FEMA, 2010b)

These six observations demonstrate the need for fundamental guidance that articulates the basic principles of homeland security—a homeland security doctrine.

In a Heritage Foundation report (2005), Carafano, Rosenzweig, and Kochem's believe that homeland security will be more successful if states and localities retake the responsibilities for making their jurisdictions more resilient, and remove the dependency on the federal government (i.e., FEMA). They note that the number of federally declared disasters has tripled over the last 16 years, from 43 under President George H. W. Bush to 130 under President George W. Bush (Carafano, Rosenzweig, & Kochem, 2005). The number of declarations under President Barack Obama far exceeded previous years with a total of 237 disasters including 96 major disasters, 28 emergency declarations and 113 fire management assistance declarations (FEMA, n.d.). According to the Heritage Foundation report:

There are two pernicious effects from this dependency: 1) states and localities lose their disaster response capabilities since they believe the

federal government will bail them out. 2) FEMA becomes distracted by routine disasters instead of focusing their resources on truly national threats. (Carafano et al., 2005)

Kettl (2003) argues that none of the federal level strategic planning “will matter unless states and local governments are a strong and effective part of the plan.” Without the support of state and local governments, the weakest link in the system can become a single point of failure. According to Tierney, Lindell, and Perry (2001),

state government has been described as the pivot in the intergovernmental system . . . in a position to determine the emergency management needs and capabilities of its political subdivisions and to channel State and Federal resources to local government.

Kettl (2003) also supports the Heritage Foundation report, suggesting that the federal government has done little to help state and local governments increase their readiness. Current federal policy does little more than to tell state and local governments to improve, but it does not provide “a clear message of what to look out for or where to be most ready” (Kettl). He identified that there are wide variations in the homeland security organizational structures between state and local governments, creating varying degrees of preparedness that doesn’t necessarily correlate to the level of threat (Kettl). Carafano et al. (2005) suggest, “state and local governments have a critical role to play in combating terrorism,” but there is role confusion between the priority of response and prevention.

Kettl (2003) continues to argue that improving homeland security requires top-down policy control, but that the top is the state. Kettl states, “It makes little sense to make this the federal government’s job, because the conditions in the states are too varied [and} local governments are creatures of the states.” Therefore, “states are in the ideal position to secure better coordination” (Kettl). Furthermore, Kettl believes “If there is to be better coordination, it will have to be secured by the states, within a nationwide plan.” Kettl’s argument however, is based in improving the current funding system, rather than improving the system itself. This suggests the common understanding of homeland security is about money; therefore, should our doctrine focus on funding?

The debate surrounding homeland security funding is prevalent for many states. Kettl (2003) reports that in the four states studied, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, and Washington, there was consensus that they do not have enough resources to meet the homeland security challenge. What this challenge is, however, is not clear in this report. Kettle states that meeting these demands requires more money. What are the demands? Kettl argues against “putting more money into the system” that it “is not likely to close those gaps, unless the system fundamentally changes” (Kettl, 2003). This focus on funding is not based on what needs to happen in the future, says Kettl, and believes that “more of the same will not necessarily mean better homeland security.”

In the Heritage Foundation report, Carafano et al. (2005) also focus on better ways to spend money in an effort to combat terrorism. The report provides numerous examples of poor allocation of funding, but the report is limited in the discussion regarding better doctrine to base spending priorities on (Carafano et al.).

In a separate Heritage Foundation (Romney, 2005) report, the reactive nature of government is characterized when, in response to the attacks of September 11, massive amounts of money were sent to states to increase preparedness of first responders without understanding where the deficiencies were. This created excessive redundancy in capability in some communities and glaring gaps in others. Small towns and cities in close proximity to each other now had mobile command centers rather than developing a concept of collaboration and regionalization and maximizing the funding and sharing resources. According to Romney, “We need those things, but it has not been on a spending strategy based on a completely layered view of how we can protect the homeland, and that’s something we have time to do now” (2005). When budgets enter the planning arena, it can impede strategic thinking. When the focus shifts from a vision for the future and gets stuck on the status quo (Mintzberg, 1994).

This is seen in the current process for homeland security grant funding. The current grant process has driven our homeland security planning instead of planning driving the actual future needs. Doctrine can be used to regain control of the decision-making process that was lost because of the “multiplicity of real decision centers”

(Mintzberg, 1994). This again can be seen in current homeland security planning—with no real direction on where homeland security is heading—no central decision center—the remaining strategic process for homeland security varies throughout our nation—not in control.

5. Homeland Security and State Government

Much of the current literature on state homeland security efforts, ironically, focuses on strategies. The primary output for homeland security advisors is developing comprehensive homeland security strategies for each state. These strategies largely center on implementing the target capability list and national planning scenarios and focus very little on what homeland security looks like for the state. These approaches grew, in part, out of the rush to develop a strategy in time to apply for homeland security grant funding, rather than taking a systems approach, using doctrine to drive strategy development.

Homeland security responsibilities have been pushed upon state governments, and according to Steiner (n.d.), “state governments have been assigned the lead role.” This push for responsibility is illustrated by the immediate development of state homeland security strategies to direct their activities. Bryson’s (2004) most interesting point that supports this is the discussion surrounding state and local governments and their gain in power over the last 15 years. He states, “In the first decade of the new century, the federal government is no longer the instrument of first resort when it comes to dealing with the most complex social and economic problems” (Bryson). The lack of doctrine has left state and local governments as the primary problem solver with great uncertainty on how to achieve that.

Mintzberg (1994) makes the statement that strategy is developed at the lower level but based on objectives made by top management. He describes this as “cascading down the structural hierarchy” to create an atmosphere of control (Mintzberg). But the goal should be to motivate; therefore, objectives should be made at all levels and coordinated up to motivate the people that will be ultimately implementing the strategy.

This directly relates to the argument for developing a national doctrine for state government rather than continually trying to implement plans and strategies based on directives from the federal government. The actual work of homeland security is primarily achieved in the local community; therefore, the impetus for developing a homeland security architecture should not only include state and local partners but be driven by them.

D. HYPOTHESES OR TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS

A common national homeland security doctrine will provide guidance for how to structure the states around a homeland security mission, allowing the states to articulate clearly how they are to perform their mission and why it is important. This doctrine will allow states to coordinate efforts surrounding the multiple homeland security missions that currently need addressing.

The military has successfully demonstrated the validity of doctrine, and states can take a proactive role and learn from the military model to define their homeland security doctrine. There are additional lessons to be learned from civil defense and emergency management models. Rather than create a new bureaucratic structure, which often times fails to recognize the interdependencies of existing disciplines, homeland security should expand upon existing doctrine. While the threat has changed, the principle tenets are largely unchanged, and this current threat is a natural adaptation to existing doctrine providing the opportunity to maximize on existing fundamental principles.

The future holds the potential for even greater threat with the continued use of terrorism around the world. A comprehensive, deliberate homeland security doctrine is necessary for states to be more effective, building and sustaining the necessary partnerships, establishing the parameters for those things needed in the overall homeland security mission.

E. METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER LAYOUT

A modeling process is the primary methodology for this research. This methodology was chosen on the basis that there is an existing model that provides clear

components in doctrinal development and implementation through strategy and policy. It also assumes that comparisons can be made from existing homeland security programs to identify best practices and provide a basis for which to begin.

The first data point collection is existing doctrine from military models. The military model was chosen on the basis that military doctrine is believed to be the standard for doctrinal development. This thesis will review all branches of the military as well as joint doctrine for the architecture and framework used to develop respective doctrines. Chapter II provides a close examination of how the Air Force doctrinal development provides a road map for how it gained autonomy. It will then review how joint military doctrine closely resembles homeland security and the necessity of incorporating multiple disciplines into a standard doctrinal document. Additionally, a review of components common among all military branches, their interdependencies, and their differences will illustrate the benefits of doctrine and provide a foundation for development of a national homeland security doctrine. The architecture and framework used to develop doctrine for the respective services, as well as joint doctrine, provide the shared key ingredients within the military process and modeling these recognized practices provide a starting point for an accepted homeland security doctrine.

A second data point will consider existing emergency management models. Beginning with civil defense and the transition to emergency management, the parallels and differences provide the platform needed to start the conversation on the development of homeland security doctrine. Chapter III will review the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, subsequent iterations, and how states structured their organizations in response to this act. An examination of emergency management models will also demonstrate that through national standards, state governments organized around a single standard and subsequently obtained accreditation to validate their programs. Additionally, a brief review of existing federal doctrine will provide insight on the impact to state homeland security programs.

The final data point is the identification of what governance structures are in place in state homeland security programs. A review of previously published studies and

reports will identify variances and similarities across the country. This will include an analysis of the perceived priorities that establish a starting point for the core capabilities of a homeland security doctrine. It will also examine governance structures, the appointment of the homeland security advisor, the various disciplines that the position is assigned to, and the changes seen over the last decade.

An inductive modeling process will identify observations from all data points, establish relationships between them, and identify potential gaps in existing state programs. This evaluation will define the components of a homeland security doctrine that state governments can utilize to better protect, prevent, respond, and recover, thereby increasing the effectiveness of state homeland security programs.

The findings will result in a proposed universal homeland security doctrine to be used by state governments. Understanding that there are variances amongst states, including risks, vulnerabilities, population, and existing resources, this doctrinal template will identify key processes and standard components that are essential for all states. From there, homeland security strategies can be developed to incorporate the unique needs for each state based on a common understanding and framework.

II. MILITARY MODEL

Decades of military doctrine have provided fundamental principles to build the strategies and policies necessary in accomplishing military war-fighting missions. The military has a proven methodology for doctrinal development that is implemented through strategy and policy and is arguably the most accepted model of doctrine. The evolution of Air Force doctrine, leading to eventual autonomy from the Army Air Corps, presents much resemblance to the current evolution of homeland security. The similarities between the path that the Air Force took and the path currently underway for homeland security creates a possible road map for future doctrine development within the homeland security environment. Operating in a joint military environment also offers some semblance to homeland security as it provides an architecture for working amongst diverse organizations. Homeland security can emulate joint doctrine in developing a homeland security doctrine. There are limitations, however, in that the military model is a narrow view. To overcome this, the architecture and framework used to develop doctrine for the respective services, as well as joint doctrine, provide the shared key ingredients within the military process and the modeling of these recognized practices provide a starting point for an accepted homeland security doctrine.

A. EVOLUTION OF AIR FORCE DOCTRINE

The maturation of the United States Air Force (USAF) and the quest for legitimacy is an interesting parallel to the current state of homeland security. The evolution of the Air Force and its application of air power theory developed into sound doctrine provides the foundation for the Air Force today. The process of doctrinal development throughout this growth helped provide autonomy and validated the need for a distinct and separate Air Force. There are lessons for homeland security in this historical perspective.

Today's Air Force had its roots as part of the Army Signal Corps in 1907. From that time, the evolution to autonomy is a result of a developing doctrine through "the

establishment of the Army Air Service in 1920 and the Army Air corps in 1926” (USAF, n.d.) and the eventual independence in 1947. During this development, discussion, and debate began surrounding the foundational principles of their mission. In 1928, “the Air Corps Tactical School commandant forwarded a paper to Washington DC titled, ‘The Doctrine of the Air Force’” (USAF, n.d.), declaring that the air force should always be in support of surface forces. This was not a shared understanding and created two competing schools of thought—independence or a part of the Army.

Further Air Force doctrinal development resulted in 1935 with the creation of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, a major Army command (USAF, n.d.). One of the key documents produced by GHQ Air Force and considered the first Air Force doctrine was *Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Airpower* (War Department, 1943), considered by many to be the Army Air Force’s Declaration of Independence. Published in 1943, it provided many of the foundational principles still seen today in Air Force doctrine. FM 100-20 (War Department, 1943) laid the groundwork for key components of doctrine by identifying unifying concepts, organizational principles, and roles and responsibilities creating of land power and air power as equal but independent forces, leading to an independent Air Force in 1947. According to the Air Force Air and Space Power Course, “Though perhaps changed within the context of new technologies, most of today’s fundamental doctrinal principles were in place by the time the US Air Force was created in 1947” (USAF, n.d.).

Air Force doctrine had its moments of trial and error, however. While initially founded on sound fundamental principles, outside influences did not allow senior leaders to develop sound strategies based on their original guiding principles. The Cold War years saw a shift from the Air Force’s strategic bombing principles to that of nuclear deterrence. *Air Force Manual* (AFM) 1-2, released in 1953, was the first official doctrine published and upheld the original beliefs of strategic bombing (USAF). However, it was here that these founding principles began to fade and move toward nuclear deterrence. The overall superiority of the U. S. Air Force over the Soviets allowed leaders to abandon their founding beliefs and would become apparent in future conflicts (USAF, n.d.).

As the Air Force prepared to engage in the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, it had no practical doctrine to guide it in a conventional warfare environment; the focus was and remained one of nuclear warfare. Although the Air Force was slow to learn from its history, the Army took advantage of the lessons from both Korea and Vietnam and the first joint doctrine was on its way to being developed. Known as the AirLand Battle doctrine, the concept provided for the collaboration between the Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (USAF, n.d.). This reunion of forces pushed the Air Force into a supporting role and AirLand battle doctrine became the Air Forces basic doctrine for conventional warfare.

Joint operations saw their own difficulties during the early stages of development. In response, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 mandated the services to develop joint doctrine as their way forward. The Air Force provided a framework to support this joint doctrine with the introduction of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and was incorporated into *Joint Publication 3-01.2, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations* (JCS, 1986). The Air Force encountered their first real test of returning to their foundational principles during Operation Desert Storm and was further cemented during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, bringing the Air Force back to its foundational beliefs (USAF, n.d.).

B. JOINT DOCTRINE

It has been 25 years since the Goldwater Nichols Act (United States Congress, 1986) pushed collaboration and reduction of institutional barriers. *Joint Publication 1* (JP 1 or Joint Pub 1) (JCS, 2007) is the result of this act and the beginning of an evolution of doctrine development amongst the services. Mandated through the Goldwater Nichols Act, JP 1 provides a framework for collaboration and learns from the lessons throughout military history. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell stated, “the contributions of air, land, sea, space and special operations forces [cannot be viewed] in isolation” (Powell, 1992). He recognized that each service brought unique capabilities, but the synchronization of these capabilities would provide for better unity

of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution (Powell). These three concepts are the key principles introduced in JP 1 and embedded throughout all joint doctrine publications.

How do these three principles interrelate? Unity of effort is the understanding that integration of inter-organizational partners provides synergy and synchronization of operations, (JCS, 2011) a comprehensive approach described as unified action, emphasizing effectiveness and efficiency (JCS, 2009). Figure 1 (JCS, 2009) demonstrates the unity of effort concept, bringing in partners from many different disciplines.




Figure 1. Unified Action (From JCS, 2009)

Centralized planning is the overarching guidance, ensuring synchronization among the various partners. Simplicity and clarity are critical in centralized planning; “complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy” (JCS, 2009).

Decentralized execution allows operational command and control to make the detailed decisions necessary for successful implementation. It recognizes that no single leader can control the “detailed actions of a large number of individuals” (JCS, 2009).

Joint Publication 1 (JCS, 2009) clearly summarizes this interconnectedness: “Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans.”

Expanding on the three key principles, the purpose of joint doctrine is authoritative and not prescriptive. The goal is to standardize terminology, establish relationships and define responsibilities—centralized planning. When relationships are understood—unity of effort—efforts can be focused on implementing strategic, operational and tactical plans to address the current threat environment—decentralized execution (JCS, 2009).

History plays a significant role in the evolution of joint doctrine. The progression of Air Force doctrine to help attain autonomy is one example. However, this also created additional complexities for operating in a joint environment. These challenges were not new, however, and can be traced back to “the nation states of ancient Greece that maintained both armies and navies faced the same challenges of joint coordination that General Grant and Admiral Porter addressed at the battle of Vicksburg” (JCS, 1997). Understanding and analyzing the coordination problems seen throughout history provides the framework for developing the foundational principles of joint doctrine today.

In a letter from Admiral Mullen (JCS, 2009), the current revision of JP 1 not only provides the fundamental principles and guidance for employment of forces, but it also strengthens the capacity of other government agencies. JP 1 is the link between doctrine and applicable strategies as well as recognizing the contribution of other government agencies. Joint doctrine recognizes that each branch of service brings with it a unique and crucial role, recognizing that these are complementary capabilities, and effective integration provides the synergy needed for successful implementation. Moreover, it recognizes that there is a distinct interdependence among the services but the level of

interdependence is unique to the situation. Joint doctrine emphasizes, “The result is a complex interactive environment in which events are largely unpredictable and sometimes counterintuitive” (JCS, 2009).

Reflecting on the definition of doctrine, a common understanding of the fundamental beliefs for an organization, doctrine then represents what is considered to be right as it relates to whom it is written for. According to CJCSI 5120.02B (JCS, 2009), joint doctrine is written for those who:

- Provide strategic direction to joint forces (the Chairman and combatant commanders)
- Employ joint forces (combatant commanders, subordinate unified commanders, or joint task force (JTF) commanders)
- Support or are supported by joint forces (combatant commands, subunified commands, JTFs, component commands, the Services, and combat support agencies (CSAs))
- Prepare forces for employment by combatant commander, subordinate unified commanders, and JTF commanders
- Train and educate those who will conduct joint operations

Therefore, joint doctrine is broad in nature, authoritative, and “serves as a foundation for the development of more specific joint guidance” (JCS, 2009). In addition to the capstone publication, joint doctrine provides several more specific doctrinal documents, such as *Joint Publication 3* (JCS, 2011). JP 3 is structured around 12 broad principles, nine of which are historical and have been included since its inception, and three that have evolved out of experience.

C. KEY COMPONENTS OF ALL MILITARY DOCTRINE

With a better understanding of the origins of military doctrine, what then are the key components that make up doctrine? For the purposes of this research, there was only a review of each military branches’ capstone documents. It is understood that there are other levels of doctrine within all branches of the service, but they are all based on the

individual capstone document. These sub documents may provide more detail than the capstone, but as it relates to homeland security, the key foundational elements are the basis for this modeling.

Using *Joint Publication 1* as the starting framework, it provided the most comprehensive doctrine, as would be expected. JP 1 (JCS, 2009) has seven main chapters:

1. Foundations,
2. Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces,
3. Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components,
4. Doctrine for Joint Command and Control,
5. Doctrine for Joint Commands,
6. Multinational Operations and
7. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination.

Throughout these chapters, the themes that arise are fundamentals, organization, functions, roles and responsibilities, and relationships. There are ties back to existing strategic documents, command and control, operations, and a recognition that joint efforts go beyond the services and into the national community of state, local, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) partners as well as the international community.

These fundamental components are translated across the different services and establish JP 1 as the overarching guide for others to draw from. The Air Force begins by defining doctrine and describes the relationship between strategy and policy. The foundation for the doctrinal document is in the identification of the Air Force's principles and tenets, clearly articulating the roles, missions and functions of air and space, how the Air Force adapts for expeditionary missions, and defining the Air Force core competencies (USAF, 2003). It concludes by linking the present to the future.

Similar to Air Force doctrine, Navy doctrine begins by establishing core values and ethos but follows a shorter path. The foundation of Navy doctrine is how to organize and then how to operate (Department of the Navy, 2010). Marine doctrine is much more

focused and deliberate. Marine doctrine is simply stated as a need to understand war, prepare for war, and conduct war (Department of the Navy, 1997). Army doctrine is comparable to the Marines with distinct focus on warfighting. The Army expands some from the Marine perspective, however, and the Army first seeks to understand the historical perspective, applying this to the current environment, and expands the detail of its role and what the future may look like (Department of the Army, 2001).

Coast Guard doctrine was also reviewed and has significance in tying the Department of Defense doctrine with the future of homeland security doctrine. It organizes around four main themes—roles and missions and the maritime guardian, a historical reflection, core values and ethos, and, finally, principles of operations (United States Coast Guard, 2009).

In all, there are common themes and sub themes seen throughout. Four fundamental pillars emerge from the capstone doctrinal documents reviewed: 1) foundation, 2) direction and guidance, 3) organizational architecture and 4) relationships. A fifth concept—the way forward—is also present but was not common among all capstone documents.

The first fundamental pillar (foundation) identifies the guiding principles for all branches of the service. Within the foundational pillar are four sub themes. First, understanding one's history, who the organization is and where the organization comes from. This understanding provides the main initial focus from which to build upon and includes an understanding of the nature of war itself. Second, a service's values and ethos further defines the branch of service and provides an overarching proclamation of the service's priorities and why. Third, these values and ethos set the stage for the guiding principles that are delineated in all of the doctrine. Understanding the relationship between doctrine and strategy, in particular, how it relates to overall national security environment, provides the final foundational pillar, tying the overall strategic environment to existing doctrine.

The second pillar, direction and guidance, is where the key elements of unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are articulated. Applying the

general principles of a command and control environment into a doctrinal document provides the opportunity to explain how these three elements are related and support each other in a synergistic manner. This concept was primarily seen within *Joint Publication 1* but has some references in the others as well. To truly understand the concept of unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution, role and responsibilities must be defined, and is the second theme in this pillar.

The first two pillars set the stage for why we need doctrine and the third pillar puts this into action. Organizational architecture is broken down into three sub themes: organization, core capabilities, and functions. Doctrine provides the basis to structure organizational components based on the values of the organization, taking lessons from history, and applying to the current security environment. These components can then assert what they contribute by identifying core capabilities. Within these core capabilities, actual functions are outlined as they contribute to the overarching guidance. These are not intended to be tactical in nature, rather a common understanding of what functions can be provided.

The final pillar defines then how we work together in an interagency environment. The ability to establish and understand how the relationships complement each other, how their interdependence is a critical component of the overall doctrine, exemplifies the theme that “Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans” (JCS, 2009).

Finally, doctrine is meant to guide our ability to develop and implement strategy. A fifth pillar that links the current doctrine to the future is missing from most capstone documents. Doctrine will remain somewhat stable, and strategy will change. Providing that understanding as a concluding pillar provides continuity for the future and our ability to continue to learn from our history.

The military model does not come without some counter arguments. The Air Force states within its own principle doctrinal document that doctrine has a mixed reputation (USAF, 2003). According to the Air Force, doctrine “frequently conjures mental images of dry, arcane, lofty discussion by distant academicians and theorists, of

unproven theories and unfulfilled promises, of little apparent use to the average airman trying to do a job down at the unit level” (USAF).

The Rand Corporation (Long, 2008) has an opposing view. It argues that the culture of military organizations does more to shape doctrine than doctrine does to shape operations (Long). Nevertheless, doctrine provides a base or starting point, and without doctrine, plans are haphazard and inconsistent. Mintzberg (1994) supports this and implies that the failure of planning is the lack of a framework.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

1. Air Force Model

Looking retrospectively at the evolution of the Air Force and how its application of theory developed into sound doctrine, it can be surmised that this development of doctrine provides the foundation for the Air Force today. There are lessons for homeland security in this historical perspective. As the Army Air Service was developing into the Army Air Corps, and eventually the United States Air Force, there was much discussion and debate regarding what the foundational principles of the Air Force was to be (USAF, n.d.). Looking through the eyes of state government, this evolution, combined with a lack of understanding of the foundational principles of the organization, has generated the same type of discussion and debate. The evolution of the federal homeland security mission parallels the development of the Air Force, beginning as a civil defense mission, evolving into the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), then the Office of Homeland Security, and finally, today’s configuration as the Department of Homeland Security. A key difference between Air Force and homeland security development is the evolution of homeland security has a more direct impact on other levels of government, where the evolution of the Air Force primarily separated different federal missions. Regardless, lessons can still be drawn from the history of the Air Force.

The Air Force published the first doctrinal document 23 years after the establishment of the Army Air Service. After several iterations and four years later, the Air Force as we know it today was born. Contrast this with homeland security, and,

assuming one agrees that the office of civil defense was the beginning of homeland security, scores of years have passed since civil defense was established. The failure of homeland security in this scenario was the lack of adherence to foundational doctrinal principles to help it grow. Rather, drastic changes have occurred through this evolutionary process rather than a systematic growth to provide a foundation for self-sufficiency. The value of using sound doctrinal principles to grow the organization, as seen in the Air Force model, lies in the ability to provide a better understanding of the guiding principles that form the conceptual basis for an inclusive, predictable, homeland security theory.

As the Air Force grew through its doctrinal development, its guiding principles shifted, but eventually returned to its beginnings. This parallels the growth of homeland security beginning with civil defense and a focus on deterrence, as the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) developed, the focus began to include response, and in today's homeland security architecture the primary emphasis returns to prevention. Perhaps if we expand on past principles and return to founding principles, rather than try to create new ones, we would have better success at defining what the homeland security doctrine should look like.

2. Joint Doctrine Model

The Air Force model provided a map of how to grow through doctrinal development. Joint doctrine provides a model to bring different disciplines together to reach a common objective. Each branch of the service has a capstone document that articulates the history, values, and overarching beliefs of their individual organizations. Joint doctrine attempts to coalesce these independent views and create a level of interdependency that provides the foundation for achieving even greater things. Finding the appropriate level of interdependence is vitally important in the development of an effective joint doctrine (USAF, 2003).

The parallel to homeland security is notable. The homeland security architecture at the state level is comprised of many different disciplines and levels of government.

States must work downward to include local jurisdictions, which, in and of themselves, have a variety of disciplines to integrate. They must also work upward to comply with federal guidance and directives. Finding the appropriate level of inclusion is vitally important to the development of state level homeland security doctrine. If direction is too abstract, it “ceases to function as an effective guide for” integration. “if it is too concrete, it becomes prescriptive—valuable only within a narrow set of circumstances” (JCS, 2009).

This leads us to the three guiding principles of joint doctrine—unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Applying these principles to state homeland security, unity of effort provides the platform for integration of inter-organizational partners to provide the necessary synergy—a synchronization of operations. Unity of effort at the state level must find the balance between being too abstract and too concrete—recognizing the uniqueness each service brings to the mission, embracing their strengths and developing the program to integrate into the coordinated effort needed to be successful (JCS, 2009).

The lessons of centralized planning and decentralized execution from joint military doctrine have direct implications to state homeland security. Centralized planning provides the platform to incorporate a regional concept of planning. This level of centralized planning creates opportunity to maximize the strengths and accommodate the weaknesses of those jurisdictions the state is there to support. Decentralized execution then reinforces the concept that all disasters are local. Execution will and must happen at the local level—with support from the state and federal level as needed. Decentralized execution allows operational command and control to make the detailed decisions necessary for successful implementation. JP 1 (JCS, 2009) recognizes that no single leader can control the “detailed actions of a large number of individuals.” The QHSR (DHS, 2010) also emphasizes “no single entity is responsible for or directly manages all aspects of the enterprise.” This recognition describes the operation between the state and locals. Centralized planning coordinated by the state, allows the locals to maximize their resources but remain in control of the command needed on the ground.

The relationships between the state and local jurisdictions are inhibited by the boundaries created from lack of doctrine. Admiral Mullen (JCS, 2007) states that joint doctrine should strengthen other government agencies, recognizing the unique contributions each brings to the table. The QHSR (DHS, 2010) equally stresses this stating “homeland security professionals must have a clear sense of what it takes to achieve the overarching vision.” Doctrine accomplishes this. The uniqueness that homeland security offers is the ability to join disparate disciplines into a cohesive effort towards a more secure nation. However, the lack of a common understanding of what that effort should entail creates tension, competition, and is inefficient. Joint doctrine has proven principles to remove these boundaries and promote a more advantageous relationship. Joint doctrine’s success is the recognition of the interdependencies of working in a multi-disciplinary environment. State homeland security programs must also embrace these interdependencies in an effort to grow and be sustainable.

As stated in CJCSI 5120.02B (JCS, 2009), joint doctrine is written for those that provide strategic direction, employ joint forces, support, or are supported by joint forces, prepare forces and train and educate those who will conduct joint operations. This directly relates to state homeland security programs. Governors and homeland security directors provide strategic direction to their departments and to the local governments that they support. States may not directly employ forces, or in a very limited fashion if they do, but they certainly make use of resources, such as the National Guard and fusion centers. State governments support local governments directly, which are made up of many disciplines. State homeland security offices facilitate preparation for employment through capability assessments and distribution of grant funding. Finally, state homeland security offices provide the necessary training and education to their departments and local governments as relates to the homeland security mission. Homeland security doctrine for state level government can help solidify these areas into a progressive step forward.

3. Key Components of Military Doctrine

The four fundamental pillars, identified within the capstone documents of each branch of the military, provide a starting framework for the development of a homeland security doctrine. The first pillar, foundation, creates an opportunity to understand the history and evolution of homeland security at the state level. As identified throughout military doctrine, understanding where one comes from offers a focal point upon which to build on. Rather than create something entirely new, doctrine is a platform from which to grow. Values and culture are a critical component to consider in this pillar from a homeland security perspective. Homeland security doctrine will need to encompass the values and cultures from various disciplines and integrate them into a synchronous overarching framework.

Direction and guidance is the second pillar that stresses the importance of unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. This understanding and acceptance of this concept is critical for homeland security doctrine to be beneficial. Joint doctrine has had its trial and errors. Therefore, the lessons that joint doctrine provide should not be taken lightly.

The third pillar, organizational architecture will define the organizational architecture that homeland security provides. Doctrine articulates the best ways to organize around the functions and core capabilities of homeland security. As seen in joint doctrine, it outlines how each agency contributes to the overall architecture. This is not tactical in nature, rather a common understanding of what capabilities can be provided. Eliminating the confusion behind this concept is vital to the discussion.

Homeland security is a complex, intertwined web of capacities. The third pillar sets forth those capacities and the fourth pillar establishes relationships and how they complement each other. The many complex, and sometimes contentious, issues involved in understanding homeland security relationships and responsibilities are clearly defined. Interagency coordination and integration embraces the unique and complementary capabilities brought to the homeland security architecture and begins with articulating and understanding the purpose of the homeland security.

E. CONCLUSION

The success the military has with this model demonstrates the validity and need for sound doctrinal documents and makes it the leading example to follow in the development of future doctrine. Current military doctrine, applied in a global environment, is set in motion through strategy development. States can take a proactive role and learn from the military model to define their homeland security doctrine. This is not to say that individual states are not successful in achieving their homeland security goals, but there is room for improvement and standardization. Homeland security at all levels is evolving; therefore, change is expected. It is time to coalesce around the strengths of each of these programs, learn from the military model, and build sound, national doctrine that all can benefit from.

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III. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MODELS

One argument against the development of a national homeland security doctrine for state government lies in the basis of federalism, separating responsibilities between the levels of government. Development of a doctrine for state governments to embrace leaves an impression of a federal mandate, creating a level of tension and sensitivity across the nation and an impingement on the implied responsibilities that states already have. Homeland security is a national issue and state governance has a responsibility to its constituents to meet the homeland security challenge (Homeland Security Institute [HSI], 2007). The premise of this thesis, therefore, is not development of a federal doctrine or mandate, rather a national doctrine developed and agreed upon by state level government, empowering state governments to adopt standards that best represent their citizens (HSI, 2007).

The progression of civil defense to emergency management reflects that applying a national doctrine is not an unfamiliar concept. To the contrary, it demonstrates that states have been coalescing around national guidance and recommendations to organize and plan for several decades. Through these efforts, a common understanding and organizational structures formed. Many of these documents, however, did not set foundational doctrinal principles. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that it is possible for state government, when approached through a collaborative effort, can unite around a common understanding of homeland security.

This chapter will review the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, subsequent iterations, and how states have structured their organizations in response to this act. An examination of emergency management models will also demonstrate that through national standards, state governments organized around a single standard and subsequently obtained accreditation to validate their programs. Additionally, a brief review of existing federal doctrine will provide insight on the impact to state homeland security programs.

A. CIVIL DEFENSE MODEL

The Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) of 1950 offered an initial structure that evolved from the Office of Civil Defense in 1941 to the Office of Defense Mobilization. During the next 30 years, 11 different offices had the responsibility for carrying out the components of the FCDA, concluding with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 (City of Fort Collins, n.d.).¹ The intent of this act provided a plan for the protection of life and property for the citizens of the United States and, in the words of President Harry S. Truman, “affords the basic framework for preparations to minimize the effects of an attack on our civilian population, and to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which such an attack would create” (Cohen & Boyer, 1951). As titled, this act was federal in nature and implied mandates that would be carried out by state and local governments, most of which revolved around nuclear attack. President Harry S. Truman reinforced this stating:

It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that this responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall provide necessary coordination and guidance; shall be responsible for the operations of the FCDA as set forth in this Act; and shall provide necessary assistance as hereinafter authorized. (Cohen and Boyer, 1951)

¹ In the article “Civil Defense to Emergency Management,” the author identifies the following list as the major agencies to have responsibility for civil defense from the inception of the Office of Civilian Defense to FEMA.

- 1941: Office of Civilian Defense
- 1947: National Security Resources Board (National Security Act of 1947)
- 1949: National Security Resources Board, EOP (Executive Office of the President)
- 1950: Office of Defense Mobilization, (Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950)
- 1950: Federal Civil Defense Administration, OEM, EOP
- 1951: Federal Civil Defense Administration
- 1951: Defense Production Administration
- 1958: Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, EOP
- 1958: Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, EOP
- 1961: Office of Civil Defense, DoD (Department of Defense)
- 1961: Office of Emergency Planning
- 1964: Office of Civil Defense, DoA (Department of the Army)
- 1968: Office of Emergency Preparedness, EOP
- 1972: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, DoD
- 1979: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Pushing the responsibility for civil defense away from the federal level and to the states was recognized years later in a report to the Secretary of Defense, written by Russell J. Hopley (1948). Hopley's (1948) stance was that "America definitely has a 'missing link' in its defense structure. Our country has, and is developing, various elements of our defenses to insure national security, but it has no national civil defense." He went on to state that "basic operational responsibility to be placed in States and communities, but with mutual assistance plans and mobile supporting facilities for aid in emergencies" (Hopley).

Despite the impression of an implied federal mandate, states around the country implemented basic tenets of this act, which became the foundational principles of civil defense for state and local government. States achieved agreement on fundamental principles for the development of a civil defense program and organizational structure (Hopley, 1948). Interestingly, the first basic principle is also part of the implied mandate, giving the primary operating responsibility for civil defense to state and local governments. "[t]hey must be the directing force in the protection of their own citizens" (Hopley, 1948).

To aid this implementation, the Office of Civil Defense Planning proposed the development of a model State Civil Defense Act that could be included in any state civil defense legislation and would provide a model for states to organize and implement a civil defense program (Hopley, 1948). The proposed model was not intended to be prescriptive or all-inclusive. It would provide a platform from which states could build, incorporating their unique hazards and conditions they faced. Hopley (1948) provided the following example of what a model organizational structure could look like (Figure 2).

SUGGESTED MODEL FOR STATE ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE

CHART 3




Figure 2. Suggested Model for State Organization of Civil Defense (From Hopley, 1948)

The manner in which Hopley's model created a platform for state organization influenced current state structures for homeland security. Dimensions of this theory have promulgated homeland security throughout the nation.

B. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MODELS

The Federal Civil Defense Act (1950), with the subsequent iterations of an office of civil defense, attempted to create a national model for states to follow. As demonstrated above, this model acknowledges that state governments are willing to organize around a national model, making necessary adjustments to meet the specific needs of their state. Likewise, several emergency management models suggest that states are also disposed to develop plans and procedures based on national and federal guidance. Beginning with *State and Local Guide (SLG) 101, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning* released in 1996 by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), emergency managers across the nation developed operational plans that addressed the threats of their respective states by following fundamental principles that were agreed to be part of an emergency operations plan. This was not designed to be a template but an overarching document that stressed the fundamental principles of emergency management—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (FEMA, 1996). The result was more of a template that many states have used to write their emergency operations plan.

The current version of this guidance is the *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101* (FEMA, 2010a). CPG101 “promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decision making to help planners examine a hazard or threat and produce integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plans” (FEMA, 2010a). The goal of CPG101 is the integration of other national preparedness doctrine into the states planning process to establish a framework for roles and responsibilities as well as incorporating the phases of emergency management into the organization

(FEMA, 2010a). According to FEMA, it shapes how a community envisions and shares a desired outcome, selects effective ways to achieve it, and communicates expected results” (2010a).

A third emergency management model is National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600, *Recommended Practice for Disaster Management*, as titled in 1995. Throughout its evolution, the scope and purpose remained consistent, the establishment of a common set of criteria as relates to disaster management. Much of the standard is reference and background; however, chapter five delineates the primary elements that should be included in an emergency management program. Compare these elements with how states organize their emergency management programs, and one will find they are almost identical.

Organization of the current standard (NFPA, 2010) revolves around five tenets: prevention, mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. Comparing this to CPG101, the added tenet of prevention is a testament to the addition of homeland security in the lexicon of homeland security. NFPA 1600 recognizes and articulates that the disaster community utilizing this standard is comprised from many different entities, with varied responsibilities and capabilities. Furthermore, NFPA is governed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which states, “The U.S. favors a decentralized approach, which means no central government agency is responsible for oversight of the entire system” (ANSI, 2008).

The influence that this standard has had on the emergency management community is noteworthy. Not only have states organized their governmental structures around the precepts in NFPA 1600, some states have sought validation of their structures through accreditation. The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) provides a process for states and local jurisdictions to formally accredit their emergency management programs. Through accreditation, states have the ability to authenticate their emergency management and homeland security programs by applying standards developed from a peer review process. EMAP is structured around NFPA 1600, as the agreed upon national standard for emergency management officials (EMAP, 2009).

C. NATIONAL MODELS

The three models above demonstrate the willingness of state level government to coalesce around national models to aid in planning and organizing emergency management programs and development of operational plans. These examples are operational in nature and not doctrinal, though. Nevertheless, they clearly negate the argument that state level government would not embrace a national homeland security doctrine. Additionally, there are federal guidance examples of what many consider to be federal mandates that states have also embraced and incorporated into their programs.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) (DHS, 2008a) is the primary federal guidance that can be seen throughout the nation, at all levels of government, as well as the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and voluntary organizations. With this document, DHS attempts to “provide[s] a consistent framework for incident management, regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident” (DHS, 2008a). NIMS has adapted over time, moving from a military model to a fire model to the current all hazards model. The intent is to “provide the Nation’s first responders and authorities with the same foundation for effective incident management of all hazards” (DHS, 2008a). With each iteration, states have adapted their programs to incorporate the fundamental principles in NIMS. Much of this compliance can be traced to the ability to obtain grant funding. Nevertheless, the overall impact of NIMS created a more consistent model around the nation, allowing for better sharing of resources and overall incident management.

A second federal guidance document to look at is the *National Response Framework* (NRF) (DHS, 2008b). The NRF sets out the roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government and the departments within them. The NRF also incorporates the concepts of NIMS for how to organize during response. The primary output of the NRF is a more coordinated response between all levels of government through consistent and collaborative planning (DHS, 2008b). States and local jurisdictions embraced the NRF, and many have used this guidance to develop operational plans. CPG101 (FEMA, 2010a) also recognized the impact of the NRF and

provided this as an option to develop operational plans. An important element to take note of is that the NRF is also intended to guide prevention and protection planning. It begins to expand the definition of emergency management and bring into the picture the elements of prevention—the key factor added since the birth of homeland security.

D. INFLUENCE FROM NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The need for a national doctrine and the willingness of states to accept this doctrine is reinforced by national emergency management organizations. The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) is an association of state emergency management directors and professionals whose vision and mission is to advance all-hazards emergency management and “develop partnerships and initiatives necessary to improve the nation’s capabilities to protect the public through prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery from all emergencies, disasters, and threats to our homeland” (NEMA, 2010).

Established in 1974, NEMA’s roots trace back to a need for state emergency management officials to unite on common emergency management issues. Goals in NEMA’s current strategic plan (2010) include defining the current system, establishing a baseline, and creating a national systems design. Additionally, NEMA wants to “ensure state and local influence on emergency management and homeland security issues, programs, policies and advocate the early involvement of states into the development of national planning and guidance documents developed by the federal government” (NEMA, 2010).

The National Homeland Security Council (NHSC) is a coordinating element with NEMA. The vision and mission of NHSC is to enhance homeland security through prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from disasters and catastrophes and promote national policies that “preserve the public health, safety and security of the nation” (NHSC n.d. a). In a report from NHSC (n.d.), “current national efforts are not cohesive or comprehensive” and continue to evolve. *Protecting Americans in the 21st Century* summarized (NHSC, n.d. b):

[t]he sheer volume of major simultaneous initiatives along with the continuing crisis environment, fueled by reality and political discourse, combine to create unintended turmoil. This turmoil inhibits our national ability to implement candid overarching assessments of the success or failure of specific programs and to effectively define a broader national approach. National efforts remain a series of independent steps instead of a united comprehensive effort—one fully informed by all relevant stakeholders.

NEMA is not the only national organization that supports national guidance and standards, as well as searching for a national homeland security doctrinal model. The International Association of Emergency Management (IAEM) has also communicated similar concerns. After decades of references to the principles of emergency management, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute (EMI) assembled emergency management professionals to identify and agree upon what the principles of emergency management are (Principles, 2007). The outcome provided eight principles that would be used to guide the development of an emergency management doctrine (IAEM, n.d.). As a result, FEMA published its first doctrinal document in 2010, *FEMA Publication 1* (Pub 1), which reiterates these principles. Craig Fugate emphasizes the significance of Pub 1 in his opening letter:

I am proud to introduce the first edition of FEMA's Publication 1 (Pub 1), which serves as our capstone doctrine. Pub 1 communicates who and what FEMA is, what we do, and how we can better accomplish our missions. Pub 1 defines our principles and culture, and describes our history, mission, purpose, and ethos. The values and principles outlined in Pub 1 are fundamental to FEMA, and all future FEMA guidance will be based on and consistent with FEMA's capstone doctrine. Pub 1 will serve as a basis for the development or update of all other FEMA policies and processes, as well as any mission- or discipline-specific doctrine. (FEMA, 2010c)

The recent release of Pub 1 has become a framework for FEMA to develop the culture of emergency management. Thirty-one years in the making, it provides a model for states to develop the framework of homeland security and the growing recognition of the value doctrine provides an organization. FEMA continues to provide guidance through doctrine with the recent release of several follow on doctrinal documents in 2011

including the *National Disaster Recovery Framework* (2011c), the *Incident Management Handbook* (2011a), and *A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action* (2010b).

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Firmly rooted in American history, the legacy of the Civil Defense Act is a natural transition for homeland security. Organized around the threat of a nuclear attack, the principle tenet from the Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) “affords the basic framework for preparations to minimize the effects of an attack on our civilian population and to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which such an attack would create” (Cohen & Boyer, 1951). While the threat has changed, the principle tenets are largely unchanged. In development of a homeland security doctrine, the template already exists and perhaps should be given more credence. Doctrine can change, and the current threat environment is one reason. The continuing shift in doctrinal thinking revolves around the reactive nature of our society. The recognition that the current threat is a natural adaptation to existing doctrine provides the opportunity to maximize on existing fundamental principles.

The United Kingdom (UK) demonstrates this growth. The UK does not have an independent government department for homeland security. Rather, it has been using a model since its interactions with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (UK Resilience, n.d.). Following the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, the government of London established a partnership to assess its capacity to respond to a similar event, London Resilience. From the lessons learned, a new form of collaborative planning was born. The most significant accomplishment was expanding on existing organizational structures to enhance overall resiliency (London Prepared, n.d.). This was mandated in the Civil Contingencies Act and provided the means to build a more inclusive collaborative model. With support of the Civil Contingencies Secretariate, the London Resilience Partnership developed. Engagement of stakeholders occurs at all levels, integrating subject matter experts into the partnership, following the principles identified in military doctrine of unity of effort, centralized planning, and

decentralized execution. The purpose of the partnership is to increase the coordination amongst these agencies, allowing their joint efforts to increase their effectiveness, therefore, creating a more resilient London. The outcome is a formalized governance structure that provides a framework for regional local authority emergency planning and response. This organizational structure allows the local level to become the fundamental means for ensuring multiagency collaboration and bridges the gap in the overarching policy development and implementation.

Former Cabinet minister, David Blunkett, affirmed that by simply expanding the current resilience structures, they would be able to engage a larger stakeholder community and avoid the need for a huge new bureaucracy (Linde, O'Brien, Lindstrom, Spiegeleire, Vayrynen, & de Vries, 2002). By incorporating a bottom up approach, the UK resilience structures have been able to create clearer job responsibilities and identify how they fit into the overall picture.

Emergency management models discussed reflect a similar adaptation as the UK model. U.S. civil defense models continued to grow and adapt throughout their many iterations until the birth of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The capacity for state level governments to also grow and adapt their models in accordance with the national models reflects the basic fundamental belief that states are not only willing, but also seeking a national doctrine from which, to organize.

The SLG 101 and CPG 101 substantiate this theory. State emergency management departments have used this guidance as the principle foundation from which to plan. As the SLG moved to the CPG, state planning documents were adapted and new ones created in an effort to assimilate to a nationally accepted way of planning. Because these guidance documents are designed around emergency management, the concepts of homeland security are haphazardly incorporated. The absence of a similar homeland security guidance document will cause continued conflict between state agencies on the best way to implement programs to meet the current threats we face.

National emergency management organizations have incorporated homeland security into their philosophies, but also they struggle to define the identity they want in

relation to this new environment. The obvious disconnection between the federal structure and national structure is disturbing. Within the Department of Homeland Security, the federal structure to execute the homeland security mission; emergency management is a subordinate component. Conversely, the two recognized national organizations that represent state government, NEMA and International Association of Emergency Management (IAEM), homeland security is the subordinate component, primarily as working groups. This disconnection in the homeland security paradigm creates the tension that occurs when trying to develop homeland security doctrine, either at the federal or national level.

F. CONCLUSION

Rather than expand upon existing doctrine, a new bureaucratic structure developed, causing a divide and failing to recognize the interdependencies of existing disciplines to confront the new threat. There are many lessons to be taken from these models. However, development of a new model will not be successful unless the key leaders from state government and national organizations embrace these lessons and direct their attention and efforts to the development of new doctrine. As homeland security continues to grow and develop, better clarity will be obtained through strengthening our capacity to be more inclusive and recognizing the strengths of our interdependencies.

IV. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY GOVERNANCE

In the case of state governments, homeland security strategy exists, but it has not been institutionalized. For example, a report from the National Governors Association (NGA), the *Governors Guide to Homeland Security (Governors Guide)* (NGA, 2007 & 2010) delivers an attempt to create what could be considered a doctrinal model. The *Guide* (NGA, 2010) is organized around the same principle tenets found in NFPA 1600 (2010) and CPG 101 (FEMA, 2010) of prepare, prevent, respond, and recover. Where this document falls short in relation to doctrine, however, is it fails to demonstrate what the fundamental principles of homeland security are as it relates to state level government. Rather, it is a compilation of best practices for states to develop their independent structures. It asks the following questions of governors:

- How are the state's homeland security functions and emergency management agencies [sic] coordinated?
- What is the role and authority of the governor's homeland security advisor?
- Are state emergency response plans adequate to respond to the current threat environment?
- How is the state's fusion center organized, and what intelligence products does it produce?
- Are the state's first responders' communications sufficiently interoperable? (NGA, 2010)

These questions are left for states to interpret, rather than providing the starting point for a national doctrine from which states can develop their strategies. In relation to doctrine development, the *Governors Guide* (NGA, 2010) recognizes that inconsistencies currently exist in state governance and reinforces the findings from the NHSC (n.d.) that there is a lack of cohesiveness and comprehension of the homeland security architecture seen throughout the nation.

The Council of State Governments (CSG) has also demonstrated a need for doctrine. In the *State Officials Guide to Homeland Security (State Officials Guide)*

(2002), the CSG recognizes that governors face many difficult questions when implementing homeland security programs. These questions include:

- What does an effective state homeland security strategy look like?
- Where do homeland security directors sit in the upper levels of state government?
- What are the top priorities of the men and women charged with protecting state citizens from terrorism and other disasters?
- How do these state homeland security directors interact with their federal, local, and tribal partners? (Council of State Governments [CSG], 2002)

The *State Officials Guide* is offered as a tool to help answer these questions and identify what role the state has in homeland security, formulate what the critical issues are surrounding homeland security, and “rather than prescribing policy, the Guide provides balanced information, enabling states officials to determine the answers best suited to their state’s circumstances” (CSG, 2002).

State governments respond in a similar manner to the federal government, in the reactive nature of their response to catastrophic events. Responses can be media driven and quickly assume that a change in governance will correct the situation. Doctrine can help work through these impulse reactions and guide states in taking a longer term view—one that will outlast the administration.

A. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITIES

The CSG and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) conducted a survey in 2002 to help answer the question, “What are the states’ roles in the war on terrorism” (CSG, 2002)? The initial findings identified four fundamental elements of homeland security: first responders, public health, infrastructure security, and intelligence gathering and investigation (CSG). The survey also identified other lesser priorities such as “border security, driver’s licenses and identification cards, mutual aid networks, volunteers and donations and public notification.”

The National Governors Association published four subsequent surveys that revealed little change in these fundamentals. The top priorities in 2006 included the same

concerns for first responders, public health, infrastructure protection, and intelligence (NGA, 2006). These priorities have remained stable for several survey years (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Top Homeland Security Priorities 2006 (From NGA, 2006)

Strengthening citizen preparedness was added to the top priorities in 2007 and improving preparedness to natural disasters dropped to number 10 (NGA, 2007). This addition could be attributed to the impacts experienced by Hurricane Katrina, which kept response to natural disasters high in the year following the disaster, and the focus shifted to citizen preparedness once the response issues had passed. Concerns about a pandemic influenza also fell to the number 12 priority after a significant decline in media coverage over the bird flu (NGA). There is also a noticeable change in the importance given to state fusion centers. Relationships and operations were noted as improving, yet there is continued concern over continued funding and sustainment.




Figure 4. Top Homeland Security Priorities 2007 (Taken from NGA, 2007)

The most significant difference to be noted in the 2008 survey was the ranking of priorities (NGA, 2008). More emphasis was given to coordination of state and local agencies, moving development of interoperable communications to the second priority. This is in part due to the improvement of state interoperable state communication structures and plans. The remaining priorities maintained a consistent level of importance to the survey respondents.




Figure 5. Top Homeland Security Priorities: 2008 (Taken from NGA, 2008)

The last survey completed was 2009 and repeated four priorities of previous years (NGA, 2009). The development of state fusion centers fell out of the top five and replaced by a need to improve preparedness through exercises (NGA). However, the survey did state that the relationship between state and federal fusion centers “remains less than optimal” (NGA). The governance of fusion centers is inconsistent and the long-term strategies for sustainment have not been identified.




Figure 6. Top Homeland Security Priorities: 2009 (From NGA, 2009)

Although more than 10 years has passed since the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the perception of priorities from state homeland security directors has undergone little change. The overarching themes that have prevailed include state and local coordination, interoperable communications, intelligence and information sharing, critical infrastructure security, public health, and preparedness. While some of these themes have moved up and down the priority list, they have continued to be in the conversation since the creation of homeland security.

Table 1. Table Comparison of Priorities in Order of Priority for the Given Year

CSG 2002	NGA 2006	NGA 2007	NGA 2008	NGA 2009
First responders	Interoperable Communications	Interoperable Communications	Coordination	Coordination

CSG 2002	NGA 2006	NGA 2007	NGA 2008	NGA 2009
Public health	Intelligence	Coordination	Interoperable Communications	Interoperable Communications
CIP	Coordination	CIP	CIP	CIP
Intelligence	CIP	Intelligence	Intelligence	Citizen Preparedness
	Pan Flu	Citizen preparedness	Citizen Preparedness	First responder preparedness
	First Responder Preparedness			

B. GOVERNANCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

Homeland security responsibilities have been pushed upon state governments, and according to Steiner (n.d.), “state governments have been assigned the lead role.” There is concurrence with this view from Morton (2008) who states that the “primary responsibility and authority for homeland security *may* have to devolve from the Federal to the state level.” Governors throughout the nation have responded, providing direction to meet these new heightened security requirements. This direction has come in the form of executive orders, statute changes, and verbal authority. Some states created new positions while others incorporated the additional responsibilities into existing departments.

This dual tasking was not new. States began to develop counter-terrorism plans in the 1990s. In fact, a survey by CSG and NEMA (2002) found that “15 states had created some form of homeland security planning group before Sept. 11” although “most remained dormant” throughout this time period (Foster, 2002).

The Council of State Governments provided a guide in 2002, *State Officials Guide to Homeland Security*, outlining what the critical issues surrounding homeland security are as it relates to state government (Foster, 2002). The intention of the guide was to assist governors in making the necessary policy decisions with regards to homeland security. In the discussion regarding governance and organization, three questions were asked:

1. Does your state have the organizational structure in place to conduct vulnerability assessments, share intelligence and threat information, conduct multi-agency planning, and serve as a liaison with the Office of Homeland Security?
2. Is your state conducting multi-agency planning to address homeland security on a united front?
3. Does your states homeland security office, position or planning group have the authority to act appropriately ad serve in its required capacity? (Foster, 2002)

As a part of this guide, CSG and NEMA (2002) conducted a survey to review each state's organizational structure for homeland security. The results indicated that 19 states created a new position to address homeland security issues (CSG, 2002). Similarly, some states initially created task forces to incorporate a multi-disciplinary approach to homeland security.

The National Governor's Association provided follow on direction with *A Governor's Guide to Homeland Security*, initially published in 2007 and updated in 2010. NGA's intention with this guide was to "provide governors with an overview of their homeland security roles and responsibilities" (2007). NGA asked the following questions in the 2010 update:

1. How are the state's homeland security functions and emergency management agencies coordinated?
2. What is the role and authority of the governor's homeland security advisor?
3. Are state emergency response plans adequate to respond to the current threat environment?
4. How is the state's fusion center organized and what intelligence products does it produce?
5. Are the state's first responders' communications sufficiently interoperable? (NGA, 2010)

These questions vary slightly from the CSG in 2002 but have some similarities over the eight-year period, organization and collaboration as the resounding themes. Additionally, the Library of Congress produced a separate document in 2007, *A Guide to Directors of Homeland Security, Emergency Management, and Military Departments in*

the States and Territories of the United States, outlining the location and responsibilities of homeland security advisors within each state government as well as the authority under which it operates.

In addition to the aforementioned guides, a series of reports and studies have been conducted to identify how states are organizing their efforts. The Office of Homeland Security (2002) and the Council of State Governments (2002) published preliminary guidance evaluating state's initial organizational structures developed to address homeland security concerns. Subsequently, the Council of State Governments provided updates on the progression of state homeland security governance structures in the 2004, 2005, and 2006 *Book of States* (Hughes, 2004; Sheets, 2005; Bell, 2006). The National Governor's Association's Center for Best Practices conducted six annual surveys of State Homeland Security Directors (2005–2009),² addressing governance and priorities. Finally, in 2010 the National Governor's Association provided simply an overview of *State Homeland Security Governance Structures*, rather than a follow on survey from the previous six years.

Each report or study depicted the results in different formats. However, some common themes among them emerged, including what discipline provides the homeland security advisor role and whether a dual role is being served. Based on this reporting, the majority of homeland security advisors are located in one of four different areas: military, emergency management, public safety, or the governor's office. Beginning with the CSG report (2002) the majority of homeland security advisors were located in the public safety sector at 34 percent. Public safety, in terms of these surveys, encompasses those agencies specifically designated as public safety or with a law enforcement mission, such as state patrol. Public safety is followed equally by the Adjutant Generals office and the Governor's Office at 26 percent and only 16 percent were located initially in the emergency management office (CSG, 2002). The *Book of States* shows a decrease from the public safety sector in 2004 (Hughes) and 2005 (Sheets) to 30 percent and 18 percent

² The 2006–2009 surveys are published on the NGA Website. The 2005 results could not be located in a published format.

respectively but increases in 2006 (Bell) to 22 percent. There is also a steady decline in the Adjutant Generals office from 22 percent in 2004 (Hughes) to 16 percent and 14 percent in 2005 (Sheets) and 2006 (Bell). There was a slight increase in the location of the emergency management office to 18 percent in 2004 (Hughes) and 2005 (Sheets) and to 20 percent in 2006 (Bell). The greatest increase is seen in the governor's office or special advisor with an initial drop to 10 percent in 2004 (Hughes), a slight increase in 2005 (Sheets) to 14 percent, and a significant increase in 2006 (Bell) to 30 percent, slightly more than the original percentage in the 2002 (CSG) report.

The National Governor's Association (NGA) reports some very different numbers in the locations of the homeland security advisors (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). The 2006 and 2009 surveys (NGA) did not delineate the location of the advisor but in 2007 public safety has the greatest distribution at 38 percent, quite a bit higher than the previous year's report from the CSG (Bell, 2006). This is followed by the Adjutant General, which showed a steady decline in the CSG surveys (Hughes, 2004; Sheets, 2005; Bell, 2006) but is reported by NGA (2007) to be at 35 percent. Emergency management offices only show 16 percent of the homeland security advisors and most surprisingly is the governor's office that was the lowest at 11 percent (NGA, 2007). This number is vastly different from the previous year's CSG (Bell, 2006) report that had the governor's office housing 30 percent of the homeland security advisors. The NGA 2008 homeland director survey did not vary much from the previous year with the majority still in public safety at 40 percent, followed by the Adjutant General at 33 percent. Emergency management and the governor's office reversed roles with the governor's office increasing to 20 percent and emergency management decreasing to 10 percent (NGA, 2008).

NGA produced an overview in 2010 that strictly looked at homeland security structures rather than a survey. The data is significantly different from the previous surveys conducted. Public safety dropped to 34 percent and emergency management

increased significantly to 28 percent (NGA, 2010). The governor's office only accounted for 24 percent of the homeland security advisors and coming in last was the Adjutant Generals office at 16 percent (NGA, 2010).

Additional themes identified in the various surveys include positions that report directly to the governor in a cabinet level position, independent cabinet positions or is it placed within a larger division. CSG's (2002) initial report did not delineate this breakdown but was seen in the 2004 (Hughes) and 2005 (Sheets) *Book of States*. According to CSG (2002), 70 percent of homeland security organizations were a division of a larger cabinet, 20 percent were an independent cabinet, and only 10 percent were part of an advisory group. These numbers did not change to a great extent in 2005 (Sheets) with the majority still being a division of a larger cabinet; however, it did drop to 52 percent. Independent cabinets increased to 34 percent and advisory groups increased slightly to 14 percent (Sheets, 2005).

CSG did not provide this delineation in 2006, but in the NGA surveys beginning in 2006, this breakdown was outlined. The distribution does not follow the CSG survey with only 28 percent as part of a larger division and 23 percent as an independent cabinet (NGA, 2006). The number of advisory group structures was not reported. In 2007, NGA reported similar numbers. Larger cabinets comprised 27 percent and independent cabinets increased to 30 percent (NGA, 2007). Advisory groups constituted 25 percent of the makeup and 18 percent were not accounted for (NGA, 2007). NGA's 2008 survey again shows little change with a slight increase in the division of larger cabinets to 30 percent, a slight drop in the independent cabinet to 28 percent, and advisory groups remained the same.

In 2009 (NGA), a significant difference is noted. Organizations as part of a larger cabinet increased drastically to 51 percent with a slight drop in independent positions to 20 percent and a more significant decrease in the advisory groups to only 13 percent (NGA, 2009). The 2010 NGA report continues this trend with even more of an increase

in the division of a larger cabinet to 64 percent and a slight increase to 24 percent for independent cabinets. Advisory groups were not accounted for in this report (NGA, 2009).

The 2009 NGA survey indicated states are beginning to align homeland security with another department such as public safety or emergency management, but it did not specify which was more prevalent. The four homeland security director's surveys did not have 100 percent participation (NGA, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009). The lowest response year was 2006 when only 70 percent reported and the highest in 2008 when 85 percent reported (NGA). The 2007 and 2009 surveys had 80 percent and 84 percent respectively (NGA).

The *Book of States* reported in 2004 that 19 states had recently reorganized their homeland security governance structures, seven were in the planning stages of reorganizing and 25 had no plans to reorganize (Hughes). The 2005 report identified 17 as having just reorganized; however, it is unclear if this is 17 additional from the previous year or perhaps a reduction from the previous year (Sheets). It showed the same number of states in the planning stages of reorganizing but did not mention how many had no plans to reorganize (Sheets). It did add, however, that 15 states had combined homeland security functions with another agency, but it did not articulate which ones those were (Sheets).

Homeland Security Governance									
Report Year	CSG 2002	Book of States 2004	NGA State HS Director Survey 2006	NGA 2010					
Dual Role			30%		29%	45%	34%	23%	52%
Rep to Gov					46%	32%	46%	49%	14%
<hr/>									
Independent Cabinet		20%	34%		23%	30%	28%	20%	24%
Div of larger cabinet		70%	52%		28%	27%	30%	51%	64%
Advisory Group		10%	14%			25%	25%	13%	
<hr/>									
TAG	26%	22%	16%	14%		35%	33%		16%
Emer Mgt	16%	18%	18%	20%		16%	10%		28%
Pub Safety	34%	30%	18%	22%		38%	40%		34%
Gov Office	26%	10%	14%	30%		11%	20%		24%

Figure 7. Homeland Security Governance Structures³

CSG also identified in 2005 that in 16 states emergency management and homeland security were separate departments with equal standing (Sheets). The 2006 Book of States report indicated that only four states had a combined role of emergency management and homeland security; however, it did not indicate whether or not there were combined roles of homeland security and public safety (Bell).

Homeland security advisors are directed to plan and coordinate homeland security activities and advise the governor on the capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents. The functions involved in achieving this directive have overlap in their responsibilities. The surveys examined demonstrate a continued change in governance

³ Each survey and report reviewed used different criteria for their reporting. The percentages listed are an interpretation of the figures presented to fall into the common themes identified. Categories are not necessarily exclusive and may cross into other categories. Therefore, results may or may not produce a definitive delineation of governance structures.

structures with a trend towards combining roles and fewer reporting directly to the governor. The distribution of disciplines having responsibility over homeland security is varied. The most consistent is public safety and has continuously been the primary discipline with the greatest number of states. It is time to come together as a nation and coalesce around a set of fundamental principles that encourage unity of effort in achieving our homeland security objectives.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

From a homeland security perspective, the attacks of September 11 caused states to re-address their current efforts for terrorism preparedness. Many states already had some planning in place, most of which started after the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 and further enhanced after the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. State governments, however, are uniquely different with independent constitutions and varying priorities. Common themes identified among the literature, however, provide a starting point for developing the foundational principles that state government feels are critical for advancing homeland security capacity. Conversely, many of the states' homeland security efforts focus on strategy development are largely centered on implementing the target capability list and national planning scenarios in an effort to secure homeland security grant funding. A systems approach, guided by doctrine, would focus strategy development on the states specific homeland security priorities as they relate to agree upon fundamental core capabilities needed for a more secure homeland.

The organizational possibilities encompass the spectrum of state government. Subsequently, homeland security structures vary from state to state with only one commonality—each governor has a homeland security advisor in some capacity to coordinate the activities needed to implement a homeland security mission. There is a common charge for these positions as demonstrated in the identified priorities among the surveys—to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks. The Department of Homeland Security attempts to provide tools to assist all levels of government in their efforts. The *National Response Framework* (DHS, 2008) provides guidance on how the nation will respond to a catastrophic event. The *National Incident Management System* (DHS, 2008)

complements this and provides a management structure that provides the capacity for all levels of government along with non-governmental and private sector partners to work together towards a successful outcome. These tools, however, are not a national model for governance. According to Morton (2008):

The Federal government has not structured itself effectively and efficiently to resource and support state and local authorities to execute integrated, national (to include the private sector and NGO communities), all-hazards, homeland security prevention, protection/mitigation, response and recovery, consistent with the NRF/NIMS/ESF doctrinal basis for coordinated planning and execution.

D. CONCLUSION

Homeland security governance and organization was and continues to be unique to each state and its interpretation of what are the homeland security priorities necessary to protect its citizens. The development of state homeland security doctrine must first align the fundamental priorities demonstrated across the nation. Concurrence on the overarching themes that have prevailed, agreement on the federal and state roles, along with adherence to a common set of principles, will provide the necessary guidance and standardization to optimize homeland security governance.

V. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS

A. LINKAGES—MAKING THE CONNECTION

Taking into consideration the definition of doctrine as defined for this thesis, a set of guiding principles that establish the foundation for the various strategies and policies of an organization, what are the linkages in guiding principles that translate to the fundamental pillars of homeland security doctrine?

Military doctrine uses principles to build strategies and policies in accomplishing military missions. The Air Force has used doctrine to define who it is, grow the organization, and ultimately gain autonomy as a fundamental independent component of our defense structure. Through much discussion and debate, the Air Force successfully used doctrine to grow from the Army Signal Corps in 1907 to the USAF in 1947. The evolution civil defense demonstrates this same concept. The Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) of 1950 provided the initial framework for protecting citizens and managing consequences of an attack. State governments achieved agreement on fundamental principles for developing a civil defense program and organizational structure. As the “all hazards” debate started to materialize, civil defense programs began to mature and become more inclusive. This growth of civil defense to the current homeland security structure parallels that of the Air Force. A key difference, however, between the Air Force and homeland security is the use of doctrine to facilitate that growth.

Conversely, homeland security is still lacking in an understanding of foundational principles, causing placement of the civil defense mission in 17 separate agencies from the creation of the Office of Civilian Defense in 1941 to the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. This is not to argue that the Air Force growth was without flaws, rather that identification and agreement of fundamental principles facilitated the development of the USAF. Looking through the eyes of state government, this evolution is lacking doctrine and has left state and local governments as the primary problem solver with great uncertainty in how to implement the evolving homeland security mission.

Where the Air Force model is a roadmap of how to grow through doctrinal development, joint doctrine provides a model to bring different disciplines together, coalesce around independent views and create a level of interdependency. Joint doctrine structures development around three guiding principles: unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. There is direct application of these principles to state homeland security governance.

The FDCA charged the federal government with providing coordination, guidance and assistance to sustain preparedness efforts. This representation of unity of effort provides the platform for integration of organizational partners as suggested in joint doctrine. Unity of effort at the state level must take this further and find the balance between applying federal guidance and supporting local government. Additionally, states must recognize the attributes each state agency brings to the mission and help develop the program. As demonstrated in the evaluation of governance structures, homeland security is spread across several disciplines. NFPA 1600 (2010) recognizes and articulates that the disaster community utilizing this standard is comprised from many different entities, with varied responsibilities and capabilities. Embracing the strengths that each offer will help states integrate the necessary skills and coordinate the effort needed to successful.

The lessons of centralized planning through joint doctrine provide a platform to incorporate a regional concept of planning. As described in joint doctrine, centralized planning is the overarching guidance ensuring synchronization among the various partners. The goal is to standardize terminology, establish relationships and define responsibilities. A level of centralized planning exists for state government. Current disaster planning uses several documents in the effort to achieve centralized planning. The *Community Preparedness Guide 101* (CPG 101) (FEMA, 2010a) sets forth the fundamentals of emergency planning in an effort to assist state and local governments develop integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plans. This is further validated through the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), a formal process to accredit an organization around the centralized concepts found in the NFPA 1600 (NFPA, 2010). This level of centralized planning creates opportunity to maximize the

strengths and accommodate the weaknesses of those jurisdictions that the state is there to support. The missing link in this centralized planning is the haphazard inclusion of homeland security.

Decentralized execution then reinforces the concept that all disasters are local. The first principle of the proposed civil defense program was giving the primary operating responsibility for civil defense to state and local governments. The initial guidance from the Office of Civil Defense was not intended to be prescriptive or all-inclusive. Joint doctrine provides the same understanding that doctrine is intended to be authoritative but not prescriptive. As doctrine guides the development of strategy and policy, execution will and must happen at the local level with support from the state. As stated in joint doctrine (JCS, 2007), decentralization allows operational command and control to happen at the local level, making the detailed decisions necessary for successful implementation of doctrine. The absence of a similar homeland security guidance document limits decision maker's ability to shape the structure of homeland security and implement programs to meet the current threats we face. States can take a proactive role and learn from the military model to define the fundamental pillars of homeland security and develop an agreed upon doctrine and guidance into the future.

B. EMBRACING DOCTRINE AND THE END STATE

Governors provide strategic direction to their homeland security directors and advisors. The governance architecture is comprised of many different disciplines and levels of government. States must work downward to include local jurisdictions, which in and of themselves have a variety of disciplines to integrate. They must also work upward to comply with federal guidance and directives. In this sense, state governments must find the appropriate level of inclusion to solidify the many disciplines into a progressive step forward. This process must begin by identifying what role states play in homeland security, formulating the fundamental principles guiding homeland security, and enabling states to develop a homeland security program effectively interacts with their federal and local partners.

Several overarching themes emerged from a series of surveys conducted of homeland security directors by the Council of State Governments and National Governors Association. The common themes include state and local coordination, intelligence and information sharing, critical infrastructure protection, public health, and preparedness. These themes are the starting point for establishing the fundamental principles that all states must address and incorporate into a national homeland security doctrine.

If the themes above are the key ingredients for doctrine, how are they related to the four pillars identified from the military model? The first pillar was developing a foundation articulate the history and evolution of homeland security. If one agrees that the roots of homeland security lie with the birth of civil defense, the progression will provide an understanding of where homeland security has come from and also provide the platform for states to build upon. The key ingredients are not the basis for this part of doctrine, rather the historical perspective that has led to the current priorities identified by homeland security directors. History is not the only component of this pillar, values, and culture must be incorporated from various disciplines and integrated into a synchronous overarching framework.

Direction and guidance encompasses joint doctrines themes of unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Joint doctrine has had its trial and error, and homeland security is no exception. Unity of effort reflects the priority of state and local coordination. Without recognition of the interdependencies of the multi-disciplinary aspect of homeland security, a comprehensive approach, as described in unity of effort, will not be possible. Intelligence and information sharing is reflected in unity of effort as well. This critical component is attributed to be one of the most significant failures of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The beginning of joint doctrine, and subsequently homeland security doctrine, therefore, is the unity of effort concept and bringing in partners from many different disciplines. This provides a mechanism to coordinate and collaborate and the necessary synergy needed for centralized planning.

Preparedness is the key ingredient demonstrated by centralized planning. This priority includes first responder and citizen preparedness. Joint doctrine calls for simplicity and clarity. It also recognizes that each discipline brings unique capabilities to the planning table, further necessitating the need for centralized planning. Without recognition of complementary capabilities, preparedness efforts will be duplicative, which will create inefficiencies or worse, fail to identify a critical area needed for preparedness, resulting in catastrophic failures.

Successful application of the first two components sets the stage for the final one, decentralized execution. Critical infrastructure protection and public health both fall under this last component. The protection of jurisdictions' critical infrastructure is specific to them; therefore, for effective protection, the local jurisdictions must take the lead. They receive support from the state in terms of funding through grants and assistance in identifying all critical facilities through technical assistance.

The third pillar provides the organizational architecture. Doctrine provides the medium to articulate the best ways to organize around common functions and core capabilities, taking lessons from history and applying to the current environment. The key ingredients, reflected from the homeland security directors' survey, provide the common priorities all states agree are part of their homeland security mission. However, the organizational structures do not necessarily reflect these same priorities. The guiding view for state homeland security structures focuses on which departments within existing governance should host homeland security. Where joint doctrine outlines how each agency contributes to the overall architecture, the lack of homeland security doctrine fails to incorporate the unity of effort needed to effectively coordinate efforts and apply sound organizational principles to address the key ingredients that are of concern to governors. An understanding and acceptance of this concept is critical for homeland security doctrine to be beneficial.

Unity of effort, along with state and local coordination, is intertwined with the fourth pillar of doctrine—establishing relationships. The relationships between the state and local jurisdictions and the state and federal agencies are inhibited by the boundaries

created from a lack of doctrine. Defining how we work in an interagency environment is complex and sometimes contentious as we strive to understand the issues involved in homeland security relationships and attempt to define responsibilities clearly. The ability to establish and understand how relationships complement each other makes possible the other key ingredients.

As a result, the end state for homeland security doctrine begins with assimilation of the key ingredients identified by homeland security directors into the four foundational pillars of military doctrine. Incorporating the identified concepts and strengths of existing programs expands on past principles, rather than try to create new ones. Additionally, it provides a method to reflect on founding principles. This modeling process creates a positive step forward to define what the homeland security doctrine should look like.

C. SETTING EXPECTATIONS—DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

To begin this doctrinal development, several steps are necessary. First, we need to learn from the military model. The military has a proven methodology for doctrinal development and implementation through strategy and policy. The identification of the key ingredients of the military process and the application of these recognized practices will be the starting point for an accepted homeland security doctrine.

Second, one doctrine should serve to unify principles and priorities for the states, providing a comprehensive and integrated approach to homeland security. The leveraging of existing programs will begin to define the structure, creating a system and process that will allow the states to organize around the foundation that they set forth in the subsequent strategy. The success of homeland security for states will be dependent upon the achievement of its components as a whole.

Finally, if homeland security is to be taken seriously, it must be institutionalized. Doctrine provides the foundation and framework to articulate a common set of core values and guiding principles that crosscuts all departments and achieves a unity of effort in the quest for a more secure homeland.

D. APPLICATION—PROPOSED NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY DOCTRINE MODEL

A proposed model for a national homeland security doctrine is presented (see Appendix), based on the findings of this research, to aid in institutionalizing a sound homeland security program. It is intended to be a starting point for state governments to come together and expand. Commonalities recognized throughout the research are provided as recommendations to aid in development of doctrine. It recognizes that, if implemented, individual states may request modifications to the doctrinal model in an effort to meet their individual needs. However, the guidance is that states develop strategies, based on the fundamentals outlined here, and adapt such strategy to incorporate their specific requirements.

E. FINAL THOUGHTS

The future holds the potential for even greater threat with the continued use of terrorism around the world. A comprehensive, deliberate homeland security doctrine is necessary for states to be more effective, building and sustaining the necessary partnerships, establishing the parameters for those things needed in the overall homeland security mission.

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APPENDIX. NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY DOCTRINE MODEL

Chapter 1: Foundation

A. History

Understanding the historical components that have led to the current state of homeland security provides the foundation from which to build. It should begin with the formation of civil defense and continue with the evolution to emergency management. This transition is significant to our current state of homeland security. Several significant events contributed to this process. They are included for context and provide an overall understanding of the homeland security environment.

- a. Civil defense
- b. Emergency management
- c. Significant events
- d. The homeland security environment

B. Values and Ethos

a. Ethos

The culture of homeland security is comprised of the cultures of several disciplines. This section provides an opportunity to discuss what common cultural aspects exist and promote the success of the homeland security mission.

b. Core Values

The following core values come from the Homeland Security Council (2007) National Strategy for Homeland Security. It is a point of departure to develop what the core values as related to homeland security are for state governments.

- i. Integrity. “Service before self”
- ii. Vigilance. “Guarding America”
- iii. Respect. “Honoring our partners”

C. Guiding Principles

The following guiding principles taken from The Principles of Emergency Management (Principles, 2007), are also common themes discussed throughout the homeland security literature. A definition of their influence on state homeland security provides the main beliefs for a successful homeland security mission.

- a. Comprehensive
- b. Progressive
- c. Risk-driven
- d. Integrated
- e. Collaborative
- f. Coordinated
- g. Flexible
- h. Professional

D. Strategy and Policy Relationship

With so many strategies related to homeland security, it must be understood how they interrelate. This section should describe how doctrine would guide strategy development to meet the unique needs for each state.

- a. Policy and strategy defined
- b. Relationship with homeland security strategy
- c. Relationship with other federal strategy
- d. Strategy development

Chapter 2: Direction and Guidance

The way forward for homeland security requires direction. This section is attempted to be covered in the several guides produced to assist governors with their homeland security missions. Bringing leadership together on this guidance will help institutionalize homeland security.

- A. National guidance
- B. Unity of effort
- C. Centralized planning and decentralized execution
- D. Risk assessment

Chapter 3: Organization

A. Organizational Components

As demonstrated in the many surveys, organization is varied and haphazard. Much restructuring has occurred over the past decade leaving opportunity for gaps and inconsistencies. Defining what organizational components have a homeland security role and how they fit into the overall organization provides the starting point in a comprehensive governance structure.

- a. Director / Advisor
- b. Define the organization
- c. Advisory council
- d. Legal counsel

B. Core Capabilities

The following priorities were identified throughout homeland security organizations nationally. They are correlated here as the core capabilities required to implement a homeland security mission.

- a. Infrastructure protection
- b. Public health
- c. Preparedness
- i. Responder
- ii. Citizen
 - d. Coordination and collaboration
 - e. Intelligence/information sharing
 - f. Interoperable communications

C. Functions

These four functions are not agreed upon nationally. The purpose of doctrine is to formulate what the fundamental functions of homeland security consist of. This section will require a deliberate discussion to identify what responsibilities belong to homeland security.

- a. Prevention/mitigation,
- b. Preparedness,

- c. Response
- d. Recovery

Chapter 4: Relationships

Homeland security is a complex web of disciplines and levels of government. These relationships must be clearly stated and understood in order for a cohesive collaboration between all homeland security partners.

- A. State responsibilities
- B. Relationships between federal and local partners
- C. Private sector and non-governmental organizations
- D. Command and control relationships and responsibilities

Chapter 5: Future Considerations

Doctrine can change, and the current threat environment is one reason. The continuing shift in doctrinal thinking revolves around the reactive nature of our society. This chapter guides our natural response to significant events and provides opportunity to maximize on existing fundamental principles.

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